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Check out my talk on the Bidun of Kuwait for AlJazeera English show "AlJazeera Stream".
الأسباب الخفية لصداعي
أتساءل: ما الذي يسبب لي الصداع في مؤخرة رأسي؟ هل هو النيكوتين الأناني، قلة شرب الماء، قلة النوم، شاشة الكمبيوتر، الأحرف الصغيرة، أم أنت؟
لو افترضنا فقط بأنني أعرف ما هي المساحة التي أخُذها من المكان، حيزي الذي منه أستطيع أن أنطلق وأرسم الخطوط بين الأشياء لأخلق الأشكال وأتزين بها. لو افترضنا فقط ..
حاولت كثيراً أن أتعامل مع حياتي بواقعية سحرية، لأن الواقعية جارحة، ولأن السحر أكثر طفولية مني. حاولت أيضاً أن أسير مع القطيع، وأن أتخلص من ذكائي ومن قبحي المميز. حاولت أن أتوهم – بمساعدة من صديقتي – وأنسى جملة أخماتوفا التي قالت فيها: "كم من المؤلم يا حبيبي أن يعلم القلب بأننا لمفترقان قريباً .. قريباً".. حاولت لكن المحاولات سخرت مني..
جربت لعبة التكرار في النص لأراها تقليدية، جربت الاستعارة والكناية وكانتا باهتتين. جربت أن أترك حياتي لمحرك غوغل ليرسمها، جربت أن أمثل أمامك بأنني مرآتك، صورة منك، أن أقتلك لكنني لشدة سمرتك لا أراك. جربت أن لا أكتب هذا النص السخيف الركيك، وكان أقل سخفاً وركاكة مني فخضعت.
المكان لا يريد أن يلتهمني، أنا لا أعرف كيف ألتهم المكان .. المكان لا يطلق سراحي، أنا متشبثة به.. دائرة سادية لا تمنحني البداية ولا النهاية، وأنت تشاهد ولا تفهم، على الرغم من أن نفضة واحدة منك بامكانها أن تحل معادلتي والدائرة.
الدائرة - يا أجمل ما في النيكوتين – أصعب من أن أتراها، تفهمها، تلمسها، تعرفها، فدائرتك كانت مجهزة لك حين ولدت ببدايتها ونهايتها وألوانها الزاهية، إلا أن دائرتي بلا ملامح، سلمها جدي لنا مشوهة بحماقته وعنتريته وجبن جدتي ورأسها المطأطئة. الدائرة خاصتنا غير صالحة للاستعمال البشري، دائرة البرانيون/ المولودون خارج رحم الحياة.
لذلك أحاول أن أخلق منك دائرة جديدة علّني أدخل – بالتهريب – إلى الحياة عبر دفع حساب شايك الأخضر، وحّل واجباتك، والتحدث بالنيابة عنك، وترتيب أوراقك، ودفعك إلى الابتسام، وحمل ولاعة إحتياط لك، وتوبيخك على لبسك الخفيف في الشتاء، ولبسك المثير في الصيف..
كلها محاولات فاشلة، محاولات تسخر مني لأن المفتاح بكل بساطة بيد المكان، المكان السادي، المكان المستحيل المركز الهامش الذي نسي أن يضعني في صرته حين دخل – بالتهريب – إلى الحياة!
* نشرت في كيكا مايو 2009
Kuwait: Flip your Avatar, Show Support to the Bidun!
Do you know what does stateless (Bidun) mean in Kuwait? It means you do not exist! You have no access to public education or health care, no employment in the government sector, and no certificates for marriage, divorce, birth, death and no civil identification papers, driving license, passport, and surely no citizenship! Many of those people have been in the country for three generation, some are the sons and daughters of martyrs - people killed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - yet they are not Kuwaiti and they have no papers.
Last February, after a long period of silence, the Bidun of Kuwait decided to take the streets, and although they are around a 100,000 in the country, only 1000 had the courage to go there and face police brutality, and afterwards, the disrespect and discriminatory remarks from the society and mainstream media. Unfortunately, not many Bidun have used social media and they are more active in websites, forums, and just few of them blog, but this is not the case anymore specially after the popularity that the Arab Spring of revolutions brought to Facebook and Twitter. The Bidun now are active on both Facebook and Twitter and in addition to tweeting, they came up with this simple idea to “flip your avatar upside down to remind people of our rights.” It is all expressed in the hash tag #EQLB meaning “flip”.
continue reading this post in GlobalVoices
Last February, after a long period of silence, the Bidun of Kuwait decided to take the streets, and although they are around a 100,000 in the country, only 1000 had the courage to go there and face police brutality, and afterwards, the disrespect and discriminatory remarks from the society and mainstream media. Unfortunately, not many Bidun have used social media and they are more active in websites, forums, and just few of them blog, but this is not the case anymore specially after the popularity that the Arab Spring of revolutions brought to Facebook and Twitter. The Bidun now are active on both Facebook and Twitter and in addition to tweeting, they came up with this simple idea to “flip your avatar upside down to remind people of our rights.” It is all expressed in the hash tag #EQLB meaning “flip”.
continue reading this post in GlobalVoices
معضلة رئاسة الوزراء في الكويت واحتمالات التحول للملكية الدستورية
عُين الشيخ ناصر المحمد الاحمد الصباح رئيس لوزراء الكويت في شهر مايو/أيار 2011 للمرة السابعة على التوالي في مدة خمس سنوات بعد إستقالة ست حكومات تحت ولايته. وقد شهدت الكويت المزيد من الاعتصامات والمسيرات والاحتجاجات ضد رئيس الوزراء خلال الربيع العربي والتي شارك فيها سياسيين من مختلف الأطراف (بما في ذلك الإسلاميين والليبراليين والمحافظين).في يوم 8 مارس/آذار شهدت الكويت أول الاعتصامات المطالبة برحيل المحمد حضره حوالي 700 متظاهر وألقي المعارضون خطابات تتهم رئيس الوزراء بالفساد. واستمر الوضع بهذا الشكل للأسابيع التالية حتى استقال مجلس الوزراء في يوم 6 أبريل/نيسان، بعدما وصل البرلمان إلى حالة جمود بسبب مطالبات استجواب ثلاثة وزراء ينتسبون الى أسرة الصباح الحاكمة. وعلى الرغم من أن الكثيرين كانوا يأملون بأن لا تشمل الحكومة الجديدة على المحمد رئيسا لها، إلا أن أمير الكويت قرر (الذي له حقوق دستورية حصرية لتعيين منصب رئيس الوزراء) أن يعينه مرة أخرى.
في العام 2003، دفعت الكويت تجربتها الديمقراطية خطوة إلى الأمام حينما قرر الأمير السابق الشيخ جابر الأحمد الجابر الصباح أن يقوم بفصل ولاية العهد عن رئاسة مجلس الوزراء. قبل العام 2003، قضى البرلمان الكويتي 40 عاماً غير قادر على مسائلة رؤوساء الوزراء لأن الأمير "لا يمس" وفقاً للدستور الكويتي وبما أن رئاسة الوزراء وولاية العهد كانا موكلتين لشخص واحد، فإن مسائلة رئيس الوزراء كانت تعني مسائلة ولي العهد أي الأمير القادم. وحتى بعد هذا التغيير، إلا أن خلال فترة رئاسته للوزراء (2003-2006) لم يتم مسائلة الشيخ صباح الأحمد حيث ترجح الأغلبية ذلك بسبب تاريخه الطويل في العمل الدبلوماسي والسياسي، وتحالفاته الواسعة النطاق، وشخصيته القوية بالإضافة إلى أن الجميع تنبأ (بشكل صحيح) بأنه سيكون الأمير المقبل أو على الأقل ولي عهد البلاد.
وهذا على العكس تماماً من رئيس الوزراء الحالي الشيخ ناصر المحمد فهو ليس وريثاً رسمياً ليكون أميراً أو ولي عهد قادم، وبالتالي فإن البرلمان اراد استجوابه من البداية وذلك بعد ثلاثة أشهر فقط من تعيينه في فبراير/شباط 2006 بشأن التغييرات في القوانين التي تحكم المناطق الانتخابية، إلا أن تم حل البرلمان بناء على طلب من الأمير قبل اتخاذ أي إجراءات. وبعد ذلك حل الأمير البرلمان مرتين ردا ًعلى التوترات المتزايدة بين الهيئة التشريعية وبعض الوزراء (بما في ذلك المحمد نفسه). المحمد في النهاية واجه البرلمان بعد استنفاذ كل الخيارات لدي الأمير وبعد استقالة عدة حكومات وحل ثلاثة برلمانات، فلم يترك أي طريقة لتهدئة التوتر بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية.
في سياق هذا التوتر، لا يزال السؤال مطروح عن الإنجازات والمسؤولية عن الاشتباكات المستمرة بين السلطتين التشريعية والتنفيذية. كثير من الكويتيين يعتقدون أن الوضع الحالي هو انعكاس لصراع داخل الأسرة الحاكمة، حيث يعمل بعض البرلمانيون لبعض أعضاء الأسرة الحاكمة ممن يسعون لمزيد من المصالح الاقتصادية والسياسية. الشيخ ناصر المحمد ليس أول رئيس وزراء متهم بالفساد، ولكن الحرب الشرسة ضده في حقيقتها تخدم مصالح أولئك الذين يريدون إبعاد ترشيحه من الإمارة.
الصراع القائم بين أبناء الأسرة الحاكمة لم يعد محصوراً على توظيف النواب والسلطة الدستورية التي يملكونها، بل وصل إلى الإعلام والمجتمع. قبل العام 2004، الكويت لم تكن فيها أي قنوات تلفزة خاصة حتى قرر أصحاب جريدة الراي أن يطلقوا قناة خاصة تقدم البرامج الاجتماعية والترفيهية. وفي ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2007، أصحاب جريدة الوطن أطلقوا قناتهم أيضاً. بعد ذلك، أطلقت عدة قنوات تهدف لتقديم أجندة معينة من خلال برامج "التوك شو" منفذة بطريقة غير احترافية وقدرات تقنية محدودة. كل هذه القنوات كانت مع أو ضد رئيس الوزراء، الناس بشكل واضح يتهمون المحمد بدعم هذه القنوات مادياً بشكل سري بالإضافة إلى دعم بعض الصحف الجديدة التي أغلقت اثنتان منها لأنه لم ير فيهما الدعم الكافي، كما يشاع، ولكن رئيس الوزراء لم يخض الحرب الإعلامية أولاً بل دخلها كردة فعل على ما يقوم به آخرون من الأسرة الحاكمة مستخدمين الإعلام لتسويق فكرة أهمية المطالبة بسلب منصب رئاسة الوزراء منه. جريدة الوطن للتلفزيون، مثلا تهدف للنجاح التجاري وأيضاً تعمل بشكل مكثف على دعم الشيخ احمد الفهد ضد رئيس الوزراء. معظم وسائل الاعلام الكويتي تبث إما دعماً أو إدانة المحمد.
أحمد الفهد نائب رئيس الوزراء ووزير التنمية والإسكان هو اللاعب الآخر القوي في الأسرة الحاكمة حيث يعمل ضد رئيس الوزراء الحالي وقد استقال مؤخراً بعد رفضه مواجهة طلب استجواب برلماني بشأن أمواله وعمله في اللجنة الاولمبية وأدائه كوزير للتنمية. وخلال ترأسه لوزارة النفط والطاقة من 2003 إلى 2006، كان الفهد قد اتهم بالفساد واستبعد من الحكومة لعدة سنوات. هذا ويتضمن حلفائه في البرلمان على عدد من أنصار السلفية ممن يهاجمون رئيس الوزراء بسبب عقليته الليبرالية وعلاقته الجيدة مع الشيعة. بعض المراقبين يظنون أن الأمير أشار بشكل غير مباشر إلى السلفيين في خطابه في 19 يونيو ، قائلاً : "البعض عبروا خطوط الدستور لحماية الديموقراطية والحرية، بل وابتعدوا عن القيم الأساسية للمجتمع الكويتي من بينها احترام القانون والدستور والتزام الحشمة".
كل هذا الصراع القائم داخل الأسرة الحاكمة يعكس بشكل واضح الوضع في الكويت والحل لا يمكن إيجاده من خلال تغيير رئيس الوزراء فالبدلاء المتاحين سيواجهون ذات الرفض بما أن كل منهم لديه أعدائه ومناصريه. فصل ولاية العهد عن رئاسة الوزراء أبعد الصعوبات التي تعيق مسائلة رئيس الوزراء ولكنه في ذات الوقت أتاح فرصة لآخرين لنقل حربهم إلى "بيت الأمة". استقلال منصب رئاسة الوزراء في الكويت لا يجب أن يكون عملية من خطوة واحدة. هنالك ثلاث حلول متاحة لحل الوضع الحالي في الكويت من خلال دمج رئاسة الوزراء بولاية العهد، العمل على حل الصراع داخل الأسرة الحاكمة، أو السير خطوة إلى الأمام بالتحول إلى ملكية دستورية حيث يختار الشعب رئيس وزرائه على طريقة الانتخاب. الحل الأول سيكون خطوة إلى الوراء وسيثير غضب البرلمان والشعب، بينما الحل الثاني فشل تحقيقه بشكل مستمر، ليكون الحل الثالث هو الخيار الحكيم المتبقي لخلق جو ديمقراطي سياسي حقيقي في الكويت لأنه سينهي صراع الأسرة الحاكمة ويعطي مصداقية أكبر للبرلمان ويوقف استهداف النواب لرئيس الوزراء لأسباب خارجية.
Why Did Kuwaiti Islamists Divorce the Government?
As a country that has an elected parliament but not an elected prime minister, Kuwait is a paradox. In the course of the Arab spring, Kuwait has witnessed sit-ins, rallies, and protests against Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Sabah. Politicians have been divided over this issue, but many support his ouster, including Islamists, liberals, and conservatives.
This ongoing movement in Kuwait might be aiming for reforms but it also reflects a clash within the ruling family. In order to win the battle, members of the ruling family chose to form alliances with parliament members. As a result, Salafis now support and serve the interests of Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad while the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood focuses on expanding its base by being part of the opposition.
Unlike similar groups in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Kuwait do not have a clear agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood does not aim to make an Islamic state out of Kuwait. Kuwait's Muslim Brotherhood faced a turning point during the Iraqi invasion when other Muslim Brotherhoods supported the invasion, at which point the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood announced their new name: The Islamic Constitutional Movement. They speak of their support for Hamas and Saudi Arabia but they stand against Hizbollah and Iran, although Hamas is in agreement with both, while Saudi Arabia supports Fatah against Hamas!
Salafis in Kuwait are an anti-Shia movement that focuses on the danger of Iran in the Gulf region, especially after the protests in Bahrain. They took the side of the government up until the current Prime Minister was appointed. Both groups use the names “Muslim Brotherhoold” and “Salafis” to gain a majority in the parliament.
Islamists demand that Sharia be the only source for all laws in Kuwait. Sharia is one of the sources of public laws; however, it is not the only one. Acts like adultery and drinking alcohol are forbidden in Kuwait based on Islamic Sharia yet those who commit them are not punished according to the Sharia but based on civil laws like imprisonment, fines, and legal pledges not to repeat the incriminating action. The article in the Kuwaiti constitution relating to public law and the role of Sharia in it has been debated for decades, with liberals opposing the Islamist view.
Whether they gain or lose power, this does not shape Kuwaiti foreign policy. Because of its strong alliance with the United States, Kuwait's foreign policy is not influenced by the Kuwaiti parliament even if the majority campaigned in favor of Saudi Arabia against Iran, for instance. Instead, decisions relating to foreign policy are made by the Amir.
When compared with conservatives in the parliament, Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood both use their tribal backgrounds to get more votes. However, conservatives are less concerned about social issues like censorship, limiting women’s freedoms, and fighting homosexuality. Conservatives are more concerned with serving the interests of their voters who, for the most part, share the same tribal background.
Two years ago, Kuwaiti Islamists (both Salafi groups and Muslim Brotherhood) lost half of their seats in the parliamentary elections. From 21 seats, they now have 11 out of 50 seats that represent Kuwait's five electoral districts. On the other hand, four women, for the first time in history, were elected. In addition Shia representatives went from having five seats to nine.
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood has historically been on the side of the government, but in the past two years they chose to take the side of the opposition since they are small in number and lack the power to effect parliamentary decisions. In the previous parliament, Islamists tried to create a group with a larger number, to have an effective role in the parliament; however, this experience failed and forced them into going back to their small groups as Salafi or Muslim Brotherhood.
In 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood's leader Abdullah Al-Ali passed away; leaving the movement weaker, since he had invested a fortune into empowering the Muslim brotherhood base, both in society and the political sphere. Former Muslim Brotherhood parliament members who preferred to follow their group rather than their tribes, have lost their bid and were not able to get reelected.
This experience forced the new Muslim Brotherhood parliament members into playing the tribal card and choosing the side of opposition against the current Prime Minister who has been known of his liberal mentality. Previously, Islamists in Kuwait have preferred to take the side of the government because they were in agreement with the former rulers of Kuwait who had supported Islamists since the 70's against leftists. The leftists were the most powerful up to the Iraqi invasion.
Salafis, on the other hand, have faced many difficulties in the past elections which caused them to lose their seats. Current Salafi parliament members chose to be part of the opposition against the Prime Minister, most importantly because of their known alliance with Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad, who is another member of the Al-Sabah ruling family opposing his cousin, the Prime Minister.
It is obvious that Kuwaiti Islamists have been badly affected by their loss in 2009. We are witnessing an opposition Islamic movement based on strong alliances and the public thirst for charismatic Islamic opposition figures. All those factors put together can explain the current tactics that the Islamists are using in the parliament to demand the removal of the Prime Minister.
Published in University of Chicago's Sightings - June 2011
This ongoing movement in Kuwait might be aiming for reforms but it also reflects a clash within the ruling family. In order to win the battle, members of the ruling family chose to form alliances with parliament members. As a result, Salafis now support and serve the interests of Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad while the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood focuses on expanding its base by being part of the opposition.
Unlike similar groups in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Kuwait do not have a clear agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood does not aim to make an Islamic state out of Kuwait. Kuwait's Muslim Brotherhood faced a turning point during the Iraqi invasion when other Muslim Brotherhoods supported the invasion, at which point the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood announced their new name: The Islamic Constitutional Movement. They speak of their support for Hamas and Saudi Arabia but they stand against Hizbollah and Iran, although Hamas is in agreement with both, while Saudi Arabia supports Fatah against Hamas!
Salafis in Kuwait are an anti-Shia movement that focuses on the danger of Iran in the Gulf region, especially after the protests in Bahrain. They took the side of the government up until the current Prime Minister was appointed. Both groups use the names “Muslim Brotherhoold” and “Salafis” to gain a majority in the parliament.
Islamists demand that Sharia be the only source for all laws in Kuwait. Sharia is one of the sources of public laws; however, it is not the only one. Acts like adultery and drinking alcohol are forbidden in Kuwait based on Islamic Sharia yet those who commit them are not punished according to the Sharia but based on civil laws like imprisonment, fines, and legal pledges not to repeat the incriminating action. The article in the Kuwaiti constitution relating to public law and the role of Sharia in it has been debated for decades, with liberals opposing the Islamist view.
Whether they gain or lose power, this does not shape Kuwaiti foreign policy. Because of its strong alliance with the United States, Kuwait's foreign policy is not influenced by the Kuwaiti parliament even if the majority campaigned in favor of Saudi Arabia against Iran, for instance. Instead, decisions relating to foreign policy are made by the Amir.
When compared with conservatives in the parliament, Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood both use their tribal backgrounds to get more votes. However, conservatives are less concerned about social issues like censorship, limiting women’s freedoms, and fighting homosexuality. Conservatives are more concerned with serving the interests of their voters who, for the most part, share the same tribal background.
Two years ago, Kuwaiti Islamists (both Salafi groups and Muslim Brotherhood) lost half of their seats in the parliamentary elections. From 21 seats, they now have 11 out of 50 seats that represent Kuwait's five electoral districts. On the other hand, four women, for the first time in history, were elected. In addition Shia representatives went from having five seats to nine.
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood has historically been on the side of the government, but in the past two years they chose to take the side of the opposition since they are small in number and lack the power to effect parliamentary decisions. In the previous parliament, Islamists tried to create a group with a larger number, to have an effective role in the parliament; however, this experience failed and forced them into going back to their small groups as Salafi or Muslim Brotherhood.
In 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood's leader Abdullah Al-Ali passed away; leaving the movement weaker, since he had invested a fortune into empowering the Muslim brotherhood base, both in society and the political sphere. Former Muslim Brotherhood parliament members who preferred to follow their group rather than their tribes, have lost their bid and were not able to get reelected.
This experience forced the new Muslim Brotherhood parliament members into playing the tribal card and choosing the side of opposition against the current Prime Minister who has been known of his liberal mentality. Previously, Islamists in Kuwait have preferred to take the side of the government because they were in agreement with the former rulers of Kuwait who had supported Islamists since the 70's against leftists. The leftists were the most powerful up to the Iraqi invasion.
Salafis, on the other hand, have faced many difficulties in the past elections which caused them to lose their seats. Current Salafi parliament members chose to be part of the opposition against the Prime Minister, most importantly because of their known alliance with Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad, who is another member of the Al-Sabah ruling family opposing his cousin, the Prime Minister.
It is obvious that Kuwaiti Islamists have been badly affected by their loss in 2009. We are witnessing an opposition Islamic movement based on strong alliances and the public thirst for charismatic Islamic opposition figures. All those factors put together can explain the current tactics that the Islamists are using in the parliament to demand the removal of the Prime Minister.
Published in University of Chicago's Sightings - June 2011
Kuwait’s Prime Ministerial Dilemma and the Prospects for Constitutional Monarchy
Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah was appointed prime minister of Kuwait in May 2011 for the seventh consecutive time in five years, a result of six cabinets resigning under his watch. Kuwait’s version of the Arab spring has witnessed many sit-ins, rallies, and protests directed against the prime minister, with politicians from various sides (including Islamists, liberals, and conservatives) taking part.
The largest sit-in was organized on March 8, with a crowd of 700 demanding the resignation of al-Mohammed and opposition figures giving speeches accusing the prime minister of corruption. This continued on and off throughout the following weeks until the cabinet presented its resignation on April 6, after parliament was brought to a standstill with requests to question three ministers, all of whom happened to be members of the ruling al-Sabah family. And while many hoped that the new cabinet would not include al-Mohammed as prime minister, the Kuwaiti emir (who has exclusive constitutional rights to appoint the position) still decided to reappoint him once more.
Kuwaiti political life progressed a step in 2003 when the late emir decided to separate the roles of crown prince from prime minister. Prior to 2003, parliament was unable to question the prime minister because according to the constitution the emir is "untouchable," and questioning the crown prince meant questioning the country’s future emir. Even after this change, the reticence to question those clearly slated to be the future Kuwaiti emir has persisted: during his term as prime minister (2003-2006), few questioned Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed. From his long diplomatic and political history, extensive alliances, and strong character, many guessed (correctly) that he would be the next emir or, at the very least, the country’s crown prince.
This is in stark contrast to the incumbent Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed, who is not the heir apparent, and whom parliament has wanted to question from the beginning. Three months after al-Mohammed’s February 2006 appointment, parliament called him for questioning regarding changes made to laws governing electoral districts, only to be dissolved at the request of the emir before any action could be taken. Twice thereafter the emir dissolved parliament in reaction to rising tensions between the legislative body and various ministers (including al-Mohammed himself). Al-Mohammed finally had to face parliament alone because the emir’s options were exhausted after several cabinets resigned and three parliaments were dissolved, leaving no way to calm the tensions between the executive and legislative branches.
Following all this tension, one may fairly ask what has been accomplished and who is to blame for the continual clashes between the legislature and the executive branch of government. Many Kuwaitis believe the current situation to be a reflection of a struggle inside the ruling family, with parliamentarians linked to family members seeking to further their own economic or political interests. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed is not the first prime minister to be linked to corruption, but depriving him of credit for his achievements might serve the interests of those who want to ensure that he will not be a viable candidate for emir.
This clash inside the ruling family has not been limited to using members of parliament and constitutional authority, but has also extended to manipulation of the media and other parts of society. Kuwait developed its first private television channel only in 2004, when the owners of al-Ra’i newspaper launched a station, followed by the owners of al-Watan in December 2007. After these, numerous other TV channels started up simply to further their own particular agendas through (by Western standards) relatively unprofessional talk shows. Al-Watan TV, for example, aimed for commercial success but also worked extensively to support Sheikh Ahmad al-Fahad against the prime minister. Most Kuwaiti broadcast media either support or condemn al-Mohammed, with the supporting stations accused of being state-sponsored.
Al-Fahad, the former deputy prime minister and minister of development and housing, is the other strong player in the ruling family fighting against the current prime minister. He recently resigned on June 9 after refusing to face a parliamentary inquiry regarding his finances, in which his role in the Kuwait Olympic Committee and performance as development minister came into question. While heading up the ministry of oil and energy from 2003 to 2006, al-Fahad was accused of corruption and excluded from government for several years. His allies in parliament include a number of Salafi partisans who have been attacking the prime minister. Some observers postulate that the emir indirectly referred to the Salafis in a June 19 speech, saying: “Some have crossed the lines that are set by the constitution to protect democracy and freedom; they have turned from the core values of Kuwaiti society: respect for the law, the constitution, and commitment to decency."
While replacing the current prime minister might appear to be the easy solution to Kuwait’s political paralysis, his replacement would in fact face the same issues, as each member of the royal family has his enemies. One way out of this dilemma would be to elect a prime minister, which would constitute another step toward the constitutional monarchy that only Kuwaiti liberals have demanded in any serious way. Theoretically, an elected prime minister should end the continuous clash between the government and the parliament, as the legislative body would be no longer be engaged in fueling the divisions in the family and, by extension, competition over succession would remain entirely inside the al-Sabah family. Parliament would be able to proceed with its regular tasks as demanded by citizens, while the emir would have the last word about the successor to the throne after the current Crown Prince Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad.
Published in Carnegie's Arab Reform Bulletin - June 2011
The largest sit-in was organized on March 8, with a crowd of 700 demanding the resignation of al-Mohammed and opposition figures giving speeches accusing the prime minister of corruption. This continued on and off throughout the following weeks until the cabinet presented its resignation on April 6, after parliament was brought to a standstill with requests to question three ministers, all of whom happened to be members of the ruling al-Sabah family. And while many hoped that the new cabinet would not include al-Mohammed as prime minister, the Kuwaiti emir (who has exclusive constitutional rights to appoint the position) still decided to reappoint him once more.
Kuwaiti political life progressed a step in 2003 when the late emir decided to separate the roles of crown prince from prime minister. Prior to 2003, parliament was unable to question the prime minister because according to the constitution the emir is "untouchable," and questioning the crown prince meant questioning the country’s future emir. Even after this change, the reticence to question those clearly slated to be the future Kuwaiti emir has persisted: during his term as prime minister (2003-2006), few questioned Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed. From his long diplomatic and political history, extensive alliances, and strong character, many guessed (correctly) that he would be the next emir or, at the very least, the country’s crown prince.
This is in stark contrast to the incumbent Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed, who is not the heir apparent, and whom parliament has wanted to question from the beginning. Three months after al-Mohammed’s February 2006 appointment, parliament called him for questioning regarding changes made to laws governing electoral districts, only to be dissolved at the request of the emir before any action could be taken. Twice thereafter the emir dissolved parliament in reaction to rising tensions between the legislative body and various ministers (including al-Mohammed himself). Al-Mohammed finally had to face parliament alone because the emir’s options were exhausted after several cabinets resigned and three parliaments were dissolved, leaving no way to calm the tensions between the executive and legislative branches.
Following all this tension, one may fairly ask what has been accomplished and who is to blame for the continual clashes between the legislature and the executive branch of government. Many Kuwaitis believe the current situation to be a reflection of a struggle inside the ruling family, with parliamentarians linked to family members seeking to further their own economic or political interests. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed is not the first prime minister to be linked to corruption, but depriving him of credit for his achievements might serve the interests of those who want to ensure that he will not be a viable candidate for emir.
This clash inside the ruling family has not been limited to using members of parliament and constitutional authority, but has also extended to manipulation of the media and other parts of society. Kuwait developed its first private television channel only in 2004, when the owners of al-Ra’i newspaper launched a station, followed by the owners of al-Watan in December 2007. After these, numerous other TV channels started up simply to further their own particular agendas through (by Western standards) relatively unprofessional talk shows. Al-Watan TV, for example, aimed for commercial success but also worked extensively to support Sheikh Ahmad al-Fahad against the prime minister. Most Kuwaiti broadcast media either support or condemn al-Mohammed, with the supporting stations accused of being state-sponsored.
Al-Fahad, the former deputy prime minister and minister of development and housing, is the other strong player in the ruling family fighting against the current prime minister. He recently resigned on June 9 after refusing to face a parliamentary inquiry regarding his finances, in which his role in the Kuwait Olympic Committee and performance as development minister came into question. While heading up the ministry of oil and energy from 2003 to 2006, al-Fahad was accused of corruption and excluded from government for several years. His allies in parliament include a number of Salafi partisans who have been attacking the prime minister. Some observers postulate that the emir indirectly referred to the Salafis in a June 19 speech, saying: “Some have crossed the lines that are set by the constitution to protect democracy and freedom; they have turned from the core values of Kuwaiti society: respect for the law, the constitution, and commitment to decency."
While replacing the current prime minister might appear to be the easy solution to Kuwait’s political paralysis, his replacement would in fact face the same issues, as each member of the royal family has his enemies. One way out of this dilemma would be to elect a prime minister, which would constitute another step toward the constitutional monarchy that only Kuwaiti liberals have demanded in any serious way. Theoretically, an elected prime minister should end the continuous clash between the government and the parliament, as the legislative body would be no longer be engaged in fueling the divisions in the family and, by extension, competition over succession would remain entirely inside the al-Sabah family. Parliament would be able to proceed with its regular tasks as demanded by citizens, while the emir would have the last word about the successor to the throne after the current Crown Prince Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad.
Published in Carnegie's Arab Reform Bulletin - June 2011
Bahrain: Opposition Leaders Sentenced to Jail
Over two months ago, a Bahrain military court sentenced two men to death for allegedly killing a policeman. This decision was heavily criticized worldwide, especially by human rights organizations. Opposition movements in Bahrain suffered a blow today after the militant court, or Safety Court as it is named in Bahrain, sentenced 21 opposition figures to jail. Eight of them received life sentences.Continue reading this post in GlobalVoices
Get Outta My Dreams, Get into My Car
Dear women, take a minute to imagine this: you cannot go to school, you cannot apply for a job, you cannot travel, you cannot go out whenever you want, you cannot do a surgery, you cannot wear whatever you want, and you cannot choose whom to marry; you are basically not allowed to live your life without the permission of your male guardian. This is exactly how it feels to be a woman living in Saudi Arabia; a country that has always had a masculine conservative religious society.
The news of Saudi women fighting for their rights have started to show up with the beginning of the Arab spring, they might not be struggling the classical way to topple a regime but they are fighting to create a cultural change within the main stream mentality that does not have any clue or logic in saying "no" to the basic rights of women, but keep saying "no" out of fear, ignorance, and in obedience to the sacred power of "employed" religious clerics. Many argue that the right of driving a car is a silly and a minor issue that women should not exaggerate in demanding, noticing all those brave females breaking the taboo by driving out and videotaping the whole process to state a point and inspire others, but those who are objecting forget to realize that the basic and small rights have always opened the path to higher demands, and that alone can explain why the Saudi authorities are being hesitant in granting this specific right for Saudi women.
Many have described Manal al Shariff, for instance, as the Saudi Rosa Park. The comparison differs in many aspects but still sounds realistic in its core because both dared to say NO. Rosa Park said NO for her deserved bus seat that was going to be taken away from her because of her skin color, and Manal said NO for those who want to take her basic right of driving a car because she is a woman. Racism is the ugly sister of sexism, and both are just two faces of discrimination. Manal might not end up becoming a figure of the feminist movement in her country just the way Park ended up being a civil rights warrior, but certainly both are credited for pulling the trigger facing and a brutal reaction from the higher authorities and, partially, from their societies.
So far, almost ten women have driven their cars in Saudi Arabia, starting with Najlaa Hariri from Jeddah who dropped her kids to school, to that anonymous woman from Jazaan driving her car while getting videotaped by her husband. The world expects more of those women because the world is still unable of imagining the mainstream Saudi mentality and how difficult it is to cross the line in a place where human rights and freedoms are rated at their worst. Now, women are determined to go out on the 17th of June despite the fact that Al-Shariff was arrested and has signed a pledge not to drive a car again, and despite the fact that their facebook event page was taken down several times.
I believe it takes only a 100 women to make this dream come true; this figure number is good enough to shock a closed up society like the Saudi one. The Arab Spring is not a "facebook/ twitter revolution" as many describe it, but the Arab nations knew how to use main stream media and online citizen media to embarrass their regimes in front of the international community. This embarrassment is what will push the Saudi authorities into granting the right of driving for women despite the religious/conservative ridiculous excuses, especially that the state of Taliban no longer exists to take the media light off Saudi Arabia as the top oppressor of women. Saudi women will drive and they will be singing Billy Ocean's best hit "Get Outta My Dreams, Get into My Car".
Arab Spring: It is not Social Media; it is Cyber Activism
In the past decade, blogging might have been a tool to start an online business or a way to bitch and moan about your boss, but that is just the western perspective of it. To us, in the Middle East, blogging was the way for many activists to find their way to connect and present the true face of their realities to the world. Before blogging, being a political activist had a definite dark destiny which is jail, exile, or death, but this image has changed a lot when blogging came out and regimes started blocking blogs and arresting bloggers then getting forced into facing western media and the angry human rights organization.
Wael Abbas, Karim Amer, and Abdul Munim Mahmoud of Egypt, Lina Ben Mhenni and Slim Amamou of Tunisia, Mamfakinch of Morocco, Fouad Farhan of Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdulimam of Bahrain, and the Safat Square trio of Kuwait. All those names were the ones to have dared to talk about the importance of bringing change into their countries. We saw an Egyptian man posting torture videos of the state security police, a woman following up the crimes of the Tunisian tyrant with her camera, a Tunisian man holding a sign against censorship in front of the ministry of information, a young group of men and women revealing corruption in Morocco and demanding reforms, Saudi and Bahraini bloggers getting arrested for speaking out, and Kuwaiti young men using their blog to push people into the streets to demand a change in the law of electoral districts. It was those crazy kids that revealed a lot of the truth, unveiled the crimes and corruption of their regimes, and showed that Arabs, unlike what they believe, deserve a better life of freedom and dignity; they showed courage, strength, and most importantly a solid belief in change and the ability of the people in making a difference.
In various Arab cities, we have seen signs saying “Merci Facebook” or “Every tyrant has a Facebook to topple him” referring to the role of social networks in creating citizens’ media in societies that have been run and ruled by state media. For sure, social networking made us live the uprisings minute by minute, and the youth of the Arab world did a great job using their foreign languages to translate the short news pieces when regimes blocked foreign media from practicing its normal role. Social networks worked at the moment of the uprising, but cyber activism worked in the long run by breaking the silence wall in fearful societies.
The glory of the Arab spring is not limited by its ability of bringing change to the Arab world but in creating a culture of “daring” and speaking out. We have lived decades of silence passed on from a generation to another believing that silence brings security and comfort, therefore, seeing this generation rising up and not compromising their rights of freedom of expression despite toppling their regimes, insisting on not settling for the minimum change created; this only shows us their valuable attempt to create a cultural change for the Arab mentality instead of replacing a tyrant with another; This is a cultural spring in its core, so Merci cyber activism.
* This is a guest post I wrote for the Daily World Watch
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