For the blogosphere in the Gulf region, the name Chan'ad became a
reference to all of those who were seeking accurate, well written, and
up-to-date inside information from Bahrain in English. Chan'ad, author
of the blog
Chan'ad Bahraini 2.0,
has been a prominent figure of digital activism in Bahrain and the
region since 2004 as he works on unveiling regime tactics to fuel
sectarian fear, suppress facts, and keep up state repression. After the
14 February uprising, Chan'ad, whose real name is Fahad Desmukh, played
an important role in exposing the lies of state-controlled media in
Bahrain and the Bahraini regime’s hiring of foreign journalists and
firms to whitewash its image. In this interview, Chan'ad shares his
views on the unrest in Bahrain, the regime’s handling of the uprising,
the pattern of the opposition, and relative issues such as blogging,
social networking, and xenophobia in Bahrain.
Mona Kareem (MK): Who are you?
Fahad Desmukh (FD): Chan'ad is the local Arabic name for
mackerel. I work as a freelance journalist based in Karachi, Pakistan. I
grew up in Bahrain and in 2004, while I was still there, started
blogging about Bahraini politics and society. In 2006 I was summoned for
an interrogation by the National Security Agency because, it seems,
they found activities related to my blogging suspicious. I left the
country shortly after and when I tried to return, I was told by
immigration officials at the Bahrain airport that I was on an entry
blacklist. I have been living in Pakistan since then, and in my free
time have tried to keep blogging and tweeting about the human rights and
political situation in Bahrain.
MK: Bahrain reached a dead end, agree or disagree?
FD: This certainly is not a dead end for Bahrain as the
current situation in Bahrain is not sustainable. Despite eight months of
repression of the uprising, there has been no end for protests. Since
March, protesters have been jailed, tortured, killed, maligned, sacked
from their workplaces and expelled from schools and universities, and
yet you can still find protests in Bahrain on almost any day of the
week. At some point, something has got to give.
MK: How can you imagine the Bahraini scenario if it weren’t for the Saudi/GCC interference?
FD: If it weren’t for Saudi/GCC interference, it is quite
possible that there would not have even been anything for people to be
protesting about when this uprising began on 14 February. The problem in
Bahrain is that the Al Khalifa regime relies on Saudi Arabia and other
foreign powers as the source of its legitimacy rather than the Bahraini
people. Until this changes, there will always be political strife. If it
weren't for this outside interference, then—maybe—the regime would be
forced to listen to its people and share some power.
MK: Many Bahrainis live in denial and state that
sectarianism is only practiced by the regime. Do you agree? Or do you
think instead people should admit that sectarianism exists deeply in
Bahrain and has increased after 14 February?
FD: It is true that sectarianism does exist in Bahraini
society and has a long history, but this must be distinguished from the
regime's deployment of sectarianism as a political divide-and-rule
strategy. The “social sectarianism” that exists between the Sunni and
Shia communities in Bahrain is akin to the fear and suspicion that
exists between any different social groups that have distinct histories
and customs. The Sunni and Shia communities in Bahrain have historically
lived in separate settlements, speak differing dialects of Arabic,
mostly marry among themselves, and obviously have their own religious
practices. It is not surprising then that there are elements in the two
communities that are suspicious of and have false ideas about each
other. The self-proclaimed keepers of tradition in both communities
benefit from the divide, and seek to maintain this status quo.
MK: How did the regime use sectarianism?
FD: The Al Khalifa regime has managed to maintain its power
precisely by exploiting this division. Abdulhadi Khalaf has explained in
his work how the
regime has not simply supported the Sunnis and suppressed the Shia, as
is often portrayed. Rather, the strategy has been to tolerate or
patronize representatives, from either group, who interact with the
regime as confessional agents of their community, and to discourage or
punish those who seek to co-operate across the sectarian divide and make
demands of the regime on a “national” rather than confessional basis.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the first political prisoner after
the start of the 14 February uprising was a Sunni former army officer,
Mohammed Al-Buflasa, who gave a
speech
about Sunni-Shia unity at the Pearl Roundabout. Also, the first
political party to be targeted by the regime was the National Democratic
Action Society, or Wa'ad, a secular nationalist group that has both
Sunni and Shia members. Two of its offices were firebombed; the home of
one of its Sunni leaders, Dr. Munira Fakhro, was firebombed; the
Bahraini regime temporarily suspended the party; and its Sunni secretary
general, Ibrahim Sharif, was sentenced to five years in prison. In
contrast, Al Wefaq, the largest political society in Bahrain, and an
openly Shia Islamist group, was not targeted in this same manner
(initially at least). The political bloc that the regime has targeted
the most severely is the “Alliance for a Republic.” Although it has an
overwhelmingly Shia support base and often couches its rhetoric in
religious symbolism, its demands are always nationalist and
non-sectarian.
MK: Wouldn’t the regime fail to use sectarianism if it had not already existed?
FD: If we look back in history, we find that the “social
sectarianism” between Sunni and Shia citizens in Bahrain has been
restricted to fear and suspicion and has not manifested itself in the
form of violence, since the 1950s. Violent sectarian clashes peaked in
1953-54, in reaction to which Bahrain saw for the first time, the rise
of a “national” political movement that explicitly sought to unite Sunni
and Shia on a common platform and eradicate sectarianism. Needless to
say, the regime saw this as a threat and cracked down on the movement,
and on other “nationalist” movements in subsequent decades, through a
combination of both co-optation and brutal violence. But in all this
time since 1954, there have not been any significant cases of violent
clashes between the Sunni and Shia communities. Rather, any violence
that has occurred has been between the regime and the opposition. If the
conflict was of a solely sectarian nature, we should have seen
incidents of Sunni citizens violently attacking their Shia neighbors, or
vice versa—but this has not occurred. There have been some cases of
violence since February that the regime has sought to portray as having a
sectarian motive, but no evidence has yet been presented to support
this claim.
MK: How did the regime employ the media for its sectarian bet?
FD: The regime has used the state apparatus, especially the
media, to incite sectarianism in society. Maybe the most explicit
example of state sectarianism is what has been dubbed the “Bandargate
affair.” In 2006, Dr. Salah al-Bander, then a British adviser to the
Bahraini government, released a 240-page report blowing the whistle on
an alleged conspiracy led by a royal family member that sought to foment
sectarianism, including changing the demographic makeup in the country
and influence the parliamentary elections. One should be skeptical of
such conspiracy theories, but it is indicative that immediately after
al-Bander released the report he was deported from Bahrain, and a
gag order
was imposed on any media discussion of the scandal. The government has
refused to respond to any public demands for the scandal to be
investigated.
MK: Where did the Bahraini opposition falter, what went wrong, how to get back on track?
FD: Maybe the biggest fault of the Bahraini opposition was
that it did not reach out enough across the sectarian divide before the
start of the protests. Yes, there were many Sunnis who joined the
protest movement, but it did not have that critical mass of Sunnis
needed to create cracks in the state apparatus and force the regime to
listen to the people.
Having said that, it is difficult to see how this could have
happened. The opposition has always sought allies in its very modest
national demands for a contractual constitution, real powers for the
elected legislature, and fairer electoral districts. Yet, the regime
has, through the mobilization of sectarian fear, managed to ensure that
Sunnis do not ally with their Shia brethren in these simple demands.
MK: So you suggest that unity is the only way to achieve these demands?
FD: This is, in my eyes, where the opposition needs to work
the hardest. The most important site for cross-sectarian cooperation is
in the workplace and the labor movement. It was the labor movement that
was the focus of the nationalist opposition movement in the 1950s and I
believe this is what the opposition should focus on strengthening. This
will of course be extremely difficult to do, given how severely the
regime has cracked down on the trade union movement since February.
Nonetheless, I cannot see it happening any other way. This strengthening
of the labor movement will of course necessarily require building
solidarity with migrant workers also, who have been largely ignored up
until now.
MK: Do you think it hurt the opposition that some
demanded the fall of the regime instead of focusing on toppling the
Prime Minister?
FD: I remember in 2004 when Abdulhadi al-Khawaja of the
Bahrain Center for Human Rights for the first time publicly accused the
Prime Minister of corruption and called for him to step down. Many of
the “moderates” in the opposition at the time insisted that this was too
radical a demand for Bahrain and that it will hurt the movement. For
most people in the world, I imagine, calling for the resignation of an
unelected prime minister who has been in power for forty years would
hardly be regarded as a radical demand. The mainstream opposition did
not call for his resignation and nothing happened.
Similarly, after 14 February, when protesters started calling for the
downfall of the regime, the mainstream opposition insisted it was too
radical a demand to call for the downfall of an autocratic monarchy, one
that has killed and tortured its people.
But 14 February brought about a change unseen before. At the Lulu
Roundabout people were able to express how they really felt. Now that
the cork has been removed, it is impossible to bottle everything up
again. The chant of "yasqut Hamad" ("Down with King Hamad") has become
the chant of the movement. It is spray painted all over walls, it is
chanted by protesters, and it is honked by cars. I think there is a
strong argument for a transition to a genuine constitutional monarchy
rather than a republic. However, there is great value in letting people
tell the government how they really feel. There is nothing sectarian or
racist about calling for the fall of the regime. In the words of Malcolm
X: "Stop sweet-talking him. Tell him how you feel. Tell him what kind
of hell you've been catching and let him know that if he's not ready to
clean his house up, he shouldn't have a house."
MK: Many anti-regime Bahrainis like to portray the
revolution as a non-Shia movement, but isn’t it more convenient and
rational to say that it is a Shia movement as Shia are oppressed and are
entitled to demand equality?
Yes, it would be disingenuous to pretend as though it is sheer
coincidence that Shias form the overwhelming majority of the protesters.
There is a reason why anti-apartheid protesters in South Africa and
civil rights activist in the United States were mostly black. This
reason applies to Bahrain.
MK: Do you believe youth should have acted independently of opposition political parties? Wouldn’t that be more helpful?
It is the youth who have led this movement from the start, while most
of the mainstream opposition parties offered only lukewarm support.
Since 14 February, the established opposition groups have had to make
their decisions keeping in mind that it is the independent youth groups,
and not the political party activists, who face the bullets and batons
every day at the front lines.
MK: If the Crown Prince becomes the king of Bahrain, will that be better than nothing?
FD: Yes it will be better than nothing. If Bahrain were to
transition to a genuine constitutional monarchy, all the other members
of the royal family would stand to lose their guaranteed positions as
ministers, ambassadors, judges and military officers. The Crown Prince
however would be the only one who stands to benefit, as he would retain
his position. Having said that, the Crown Prince has so far given little
reason for the people to believe that he has the desire or the
political ability to take on the rest of his family in trying to
implement such a transition.
MK: The Media has turned its back to Bahrain with
Saudi pressure and other factors, how do you think Bahrainis should
respond to that?
FD: While the international media has not been paying as much
attention to Bahrain as other Arab uprisings, when they do report on the
situation it is generally sympathetic to the cause of the pro-democracy
movement and critical of the regime. This is not where the problem
lies. The real problem lies at home where the state-controlled local
media has managed to divide and scare the people along sectarian lies.
Bahrainis need to challenge this narrative through people-to-people
contact and solidarity building.
MK: Do you believe the regime has an electronic army that works on bashing oppositionists and their supporters?
FD: I don not think there is any hard evidence to prove that
the regime has such an electronic army, but anyone who blogs or tweets
against the regime in Bahrain is familiar with the barrage of foul
personal attacks that comes in response. We also know that the
government has hired Washington D.C.-based Public Relations company
“Qorvis,” which offers online reputation management as one of its
services. According to a Huffington Post
article,
“the firm uses ‘black arts’ by creating fake blogs and websites that
link back to positive content, ‘to make sure that no one online comes
across the bad stuff,’ says the former insider. Other techniques include
the use of social media, including Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.” So
potentially, this may be happening in Bahrain, but there is no hard
evidence for it yet.
MK: In the last year, blogging has been replaced in
Bahrain with social networking. Do you think that was a productive shift
considering how much more organized and argument-strong blogging is,
comparatively speaking?
FD: Much of the group brainstorming, planning, and organizing
of online activism movements still takes place on discussion forums like
BahrainOnline, rather than on blogs, Facebook, or twitter. However,
real-time social media tools like Facebook and twitter were essential
for real time information dissemination and feedback. The latest
information about a protest or police attack could be spread around the
country and the world within seconds. This does have its down side, as
it means that false rumors can and are spread just as faced using this
social media tools. But of course the real blame for this is the people
who spread or choose to believe this false information without any real
evidence for it.
MK: Remembering Ali Abdulimam?
FD: I was actively involved in the online campaign to free Ali
after he was arrested in 2005 along with two other administrators of
BahrainOnline. It was the first case of a blogger being detained in the
Gulf as far as I know. His short time in detention brought him
international recognition and allowed him to meet and share notes with
other cyber-dissidents around the world. All the while his website
continued serving hub for opposition debate and discussion, and in
August 2010 he was arrested again along with scores of other people as
part of a widespread crackdown on the opposition. He was released this
February after the start of the uprising, but rather than keep quiet,
the first thing he did after leaving prison was to join the protests at
Pearl Roundabout. He spoke to the international media about the torture
and abuse he faced during his detention. So when the Saudi-backed
crackdown began in March he was to be rounded up. The security forces
raided his family’s home to find him, but he is believed to have fled
before their arrival. He has been missing in the eight months since
then, and was sentenced in June in absentia to fifteen years in prison
by a military court. I hope he actually is in hiding somewhere safe as I
have heard.
MK: Do you think the choice of many netizens to remain anonymous have weakened the credibility of news coming from Bahrain?
FD: A great many netizens in Bahrain have always chosen to
hide behind pseudonyms because of the threat from the state that has
always existed. I myself tried to hide my identity while I was in
Bahrain. You can assess the trustworthiness of anonymous online sources
by looking at: (i) whether they are regarded as trustworthy by people
who you trust highly, and (ii) how consistently accurate a source’s
published information proves to be after observing them over a period of
time. The problem that was witnessed in Bahrain was that after the
start of the uprising there was a sudden rush of people joining twitter
without understanding how it works or those who weren't as concerned
about sources. At the same time you had hundreds of new twitter accounts
being created overnight that appeared to be actively spreading false
information about the unrest and crackdown.
MK: If Sunnis committed anti-Shia acts, then do you think
Shia acted reactionary by making remarks against naturalized Bahrainis
who are being stereotyped as mercenaries?
FD: Yes I think xenophobia is just as condemnable as
sectarianism. However there is a difference in Bahrain’s case. Most of
the opposition activists I have met are keen to make the distinction
that when they use the term “naturalization” they are usually referring
to “political naturalization.” That is, the use of naturalization for
demographic engineering as a political tool. Having said that, I do not
think it is particularly helpful to repeatedly use this term as a
blanket insult against people, many of whom are just looking for a
decent life. Nor should we deny the existence of xenophobia in Bahrain.
MK: Shouldn’t the naturalized Bahrainis be accepted in
society instead of being rejected and hated? The remarks used against
them exclude them for being racially non-Arabs or recent arrivals?
FD: Yes, just because the policy of political naturalization
should be condemned does not mean that naturalized people should be
hated. This applies especially to the many naturalized citizens, or
their children, who were born and raised in Bahrain and regard it as
their home. If the opposition was wise it would try harder to reach out
to them, even those working in the security forces, to make them
understand that they are both being exploited by the same fat cats.
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