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| Image from I. Piccioni-A. Tiso/Molo7 Photo Agency |
The issue of statelessness in the Gulf is as old as the post-colonial
oil states from which they are actively being excluded. Until the
1980s, the status of the Bedoon was not seen as a political issue, with
the fledgling governments more concerned with state building functions
than with further limiting citizenship rights. The oil bust of the
1980s, however, strained the budgets of the Gulf regimes, who responded
by constraining social services and restricting citizenship laws. The
brunt of these restrictions largely fell on the stateless population—and
in some Gulf states on migrant workers as well—who had been allowed
health care and public education. Their intent was to force those
seeking Gulf citizenship—particularly the Bedoon—to leave and start
their lives as citizens elsewhere. These restrictions only served to
exacerbate the numbers of stateless subjects, as few opted to abandon
their family ties and communities or their geographic attachments in
search for a new home country.
The 2010
UNCHR statistical book
maintains that there are seventy thousand stateless subjects in the
Saudi kingdom alone. This surely excludes hundreds of thousands of
Mawaleed,
a category which includes both those who are born in the country to
foreign parents and those children of Saudi women from foreign fathers.
In both cases, there is rarely any activism or reporting on
statelessness in Saudi Arabia. It is believed that the seventy thousand
includes families living in remote areas who are either unaware of
documentation procedures or do not care to be registered in the system.
In Bahrain, considering the
politicization of naturalization,
the oppressed Shia majority understandably opposes the idea of granting
citizenship. In the past decade, stateless Bahrainis and “mercenaries”
have been naturalized as the state has sought to shift the demographic
balance. Bahraini opposition
claims that the regime has
naturalized
up to 120,000 but there are no official numbers. Those naturalized
stateless persons are believed to be residents of Bahrain for two
generations or children of Bahraini women who are married to foreigners.
The “mercenaries” were naturalized after being brought from Yemen,
Syria, Pakistan and other countries to work in security forces. The
1994-2001 popular uprising had resulted in the repeal of the State
Security Law and the reestablishment of constitutional rule under the
new monarch, thus limiting state power. In response, the Prime Minister
expanded
political naturalization in an attempt to change the demographics of
Bahrain to weaken the Shia majority. He felt that he was becoming
powerless and, with the support of Saudi Arabia, led the push for
naturalization to further strengthen his role through the police and
army. Resultantly, the current number of stateless persons in Bahrain
does not exceed two thousand, most of whom are children of Bahraini
women.
While the struggles of stateless communities in other Gulf countries
remain largely undocumented, Qatar presents a slightly different case.
Several
reports
were released for the first time earlier this year about the stateless
population there, estimated at three thousand people who belong to one
or two tribes. The reports provide accounts from a number of the Bedoon
about their living conditions and in which they contrast the Bedoon’s
struggle to the ease with which athletes are naturalized in return for
their services. The numbers are comparatively smaller but again, little
is known about their plight. Few Qatari Bedoon are politically
active
online and there are no statistics, official or otherwise, on the
number of children of Qatari mothers who have not been naturalized. The
reports’ criticism centers
around Qatar’s
increasing role and intervention in regional politics when the small
state should be dealing with its own internal problems, including its
major violations of human rights against migrant workers and its
stateless community.
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates present the most interesting
cases of statelessness in the Gulf. Kuwait has approximately 120,000
Bedoon, the vast majority of whom belong to Arab tribes that had settled
in the desert prior to independence. Kuwait does not grant women the
right to pass citizenship on to their children, which has greatly
exacerbated the problem of statelessness, since many Kuwaiti women have
and continue to marry Bedoon men. Instead of attempting to assuage the
increasing tension with and the struggles of the Bedoon population,
Kuwaiti authorities issued a
secret decision
in 1986 to gradually strip this community of all its rights. Denied any
form of official documentation in the 1990s, the Bedoon lost all access
to formal employment, health care, and education.
In 2008, the Bedoon in Kuwait began to organize politically for the
first time (following the lead of activists in the United
Kingdom—notably, Mohammed Waly Al-Enizi—and in Canada), and have become
increasingly active. They started with sit-ins, but participation was
low and they were met with significant opposition from the police. With
the failure of organized sit-ins, Bedoon activists turned to awareness
campaigns about the plight of their community. They started to sponsor
lectures that educated Kuwaiti society and media about the Bedoon,
focusing on first dismantling all the existing stereotypes on those who
are stateless and shedding light on the forms of discrimination they
face. It was not until the 2011 uprisings, however, that things really
began to change. Bedoon protests started in February 2011. Tens of Bedoon activists
have subsequently been arrested, with some tortured, released, tried,
and then acquitted. Kuwaiti authorities have responded recklessly,
without any sense of direction or long-term plan. On the one hand, they
made big promises to the Bedoon in order to diffuse the tension when
their protests garnered significant media attention. On the other hand,
they violently cracked down on protesters when the media was preoccupied
with other things. Bedoon protests are ongoing nonetheless. They are
mostly organized in reaction to official statements and the arrest of
activists, or to bring attention to their plight. The protests often
take advantage of political opportunities and openings, when the country
is going through a political crisis such as the latest court decision
to dissolve the parliament for being unconstitutional. The Bedoon have
achieved little by way of legal gains. Yet, Kuwaiti society is finally
getting to know the reality of Bedoon life and suffering and some
Kuwaitis are starting to extend their support. Kuwaiti “
Group 29”
was able to secure one hundred seats for the highest ranking Bedoon
students after having a daily sit-in in front of Kuwait University’s
admission office last month.
The struggle of the Bedoon in the United Arab Emirates has recently
emerged from the political unrest of the Arab Spring. Until last year,
the United Arab Emirates had not only successfully managed to block any
information about its stateless communities, but was also actively
engaged in removing the Bedoon from their homeland. UAE authorities
bought passports from the Comoros and gave its stateless community an
ultimatum: either accept these new citizenships, or become illegal
residents and detained. Surely this inspired their Kuwaiti counterparts
who instead purchased Eritrean, Dominican, and Albanian
passports. The United Arab Emirates provides no official statistics on its stateless community but according to a
report in the Emirati English-language newspaper
The National,
they numbered about one hundred thousand four years ago. The actual
population is likely double this number, without even including the
thousands of children of Emirati mothers who are denied passing
citizenship to their children. While the United Arab Emirates has
recently claimed to have issued a decision to allow female citizens to
pass citizenship to their children, in reality, committees were formed
to examine their cases on an individual basis.
In the past few years, when communicating online with stateless men
from the United Arab Emirates, I was surprised by how terrified they
were of speaking about statelessness or even telling me that they are
stateless. Some Emirati artists and bloggers do not openly admit that
they are stateless for fear of both being judged according to society’s
stereotypes against them and being arrested. Their fears are justified,
given that the UAE authorities recently revoked Bedoon activist Ahmed
Abdalkhaleq’s travelling document, gave him a Comoros passport instead,
and exiled him to Thailand. Abdalkhaeq was one of the
UAE5 who were arrested last year for demanding reforms. According to
The Economist,
he also runs a website about the stateless community in his country. So
far, the wave of political arrests in the United Arab Emirates has cost
the community fourteen members and stripped several of them of their
nationalities.
In Kuwait, there are many
blogs and
forums
that allow the Bedoon to speak of their cause. This year alone
witnessed the rise of Kuwaiti activists devoted to the Bedoon, their
protests, and their rights. The cyber world, however, seems to have no
place for the Emirati activists, who are much more fearful of their
security regime. However, just the way the
UAE5
encouraged others to speak up, Abdelkhaleq seems to be the one who will
set up the way for his community to be active and speak out.
Abdelkhaleq is one of the UAE5, but he had received little media
attention until his detention and subsequent deportation.
Despite all differences, with Saudi Arabia being the most extreme
model and Kuwait being the least oppressive example, the Gulf countries
look very much alike in their failed policies when dealing with
statelessness. This is a region with corrupt and oppressive
authoritarian regimes committing political and economic suicide by
refusing to heed calls for change. This invisible nation of stateless
communities residing in and around the Gulf is becoming increasingly
outspoken. Oppression, forged passports, and exile are all methods that
do not seem to work with the Gulf’s stateless community, especially when
we consider how thousands of young women and men are denied basic
rights and have no means to leave their countries. The Gulf states, with
the exception of Bahrain, have so far been able to portray their
countries as less in crisis than the rest of the Arab region and thus to
hide their internal problems from the light of day. This status quo
will not long remain, as minorities and communities like the Bedoon
continue to mobilize.
